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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
DAMAGES-REVOCABLE CONTRACT-Chevrolet Motor Co v.
McCullough Motor Co., 6 Fed. (2d) 212 (C. C. A., 9th Cir.,
1925).
Plaintiff had a contract as defendant's exclusive agent for auto-
mobiles in a certain territory. The contract, by its terms, was termin-
able at will upon 5 days' notice. Defendant made a similar contract
with a third person for the same territory, without giving plaintiff
any prior notice. Defendant claimed that this contract operated as
notice of its intention to terminate its contract with plaintiff, in accord-
ance with the terms of the latter contract, hence was no breach. The
trial court took the view that the defendant had committed a total
breach and had forfeited all its rights under the contract, including its
right to terminate on 5 days' notice; hence substantial damages were
allowed. The appellate court held that defendant's action constituted
a beach of the contract, but only nominal damages should have been
awarded.
None of the cases cited by the court to sustain its decision really
supports the proposition that for the breach of a contract revocable at
will upon short notice only nominal damages may be recovered. Ellis
7. Dodge Bros. (D. C.) 237 F. 860, and Oakland Motor Car Co. v.
Indiana Automobile Co., 121 C. C. A. 319. 201 F. 499, hold that con-
tracts of agency for automobiles, terminable upon 15 and 30 days'
notice, respectively, are really not contracts at all. insofar as they
are executory, for want of mutuality of obligation. Both these
cases were also decided on other points, and the court in Wilson v.
Studebaker Corfi. of America (D. C.) 240 F. 801 (also cited) said. in
commenting on Ellis v. Dodge Bros.: "The case is authority for the
proposition that where a defendant has not agreed to deliver he can-
not be held answerable in damages for not having delivered, but it is
not an authoritative ruling for the proposition that a defendant who
has azreed to deliver need not comply with his contract because he
had the right to end it at will." The case quoted from held that
where a party to a contract has defaulted he may be held answerable.
though he had the right to relieve himself of the obligation by revoca-
tion. The following cases, in addition to those cited, are authority
for the statement that a revocable contract, insofar as it is executory,
lacks mutuality: U. S. v. White Oak Coal Co., 5 F. (2d) 439; Miami
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693; Louisville
Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Zeigler, 196 Ky. 414, 244 S. W. 899; Mc-
Caffrey v. B. B. & R. Knight, Inc., 282 F. 334; Gurfein v. Werbel-
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ovsky (Conn.) 118 A. 32; Radetsky v. Palmer et al., 70 Colo. 146,
199 P. 490; National Surety Co. v. City of Atlanta, 151 Ga. 123, 106
S. E. 179; Bernstein et al. v. W. B. Mfg. Co. (Mass.) 131 N. E.
200; City of Pocatello v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 267 F.
181; Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Benton Mercantile Co., 204 Ala. 415,
85 So. 723; Rodgers v. Larrimore & Perkins, 188 Ky. 468, 222 S. W.
512; Daniel Boone Coal Co. v. Miller et ux., 186 Ky. 561, 217 S. W.
666; Steinwender-Stoffregen Coffee Co. v. F. T. Guenther Grocery
Co. (Ky.) 80 S. W. 1170; American Agricultural Chemical Co. v.
Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171, 48 S. E. 868; Thomas v. West-
ern Indemnity Co. (Tex.) 206 S. W. 944; Eclipse Oil Co. v. South
Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. E. 923; Hinton Foundry, Machine
& Plumbing Co. v. Lilly Lumber Co., 73 W. Va. 477, 80 S. E. 773.
But none of these cases allows even nominal damages for a breach of
a revocable contract.
The next group of cases cited (Fisher v. Monroe, 2 Misc. Rep.
326, 21 N. Y. S. 995, and Derry v. Board of Education, 102 Mich.
631, 61 N. W. 61) hold simply that where a servant is discharged
without the notice stipulated by the contract of employment, the dam-
ages are the amount of his wages for the period of notice. This
proposition is well established by such decisions as Shea v. Kerr, 1 Pa.
530, 43 A. 843; Gates v. Stead, 54 App. Div. 448, 66 N. Y. S. 829;
McGregor v. Gilmore, 25 Misc. Rep. 312, 54 N. Y. S. 589; DeVere
v. Gilmore, 25 Misc. Rep. 306, 54 N. Y. S. 587; Johnson v. Pacific
Bank & Store Fixture Co., 59 Wash. 58, 109 P. 205. This principle
seems to have been applied to the instant case on the assumption
that the amount of profit plaintiff could have made under the contract
as an automobile agent during the 5 days' period was negligible.
The remaining case cited, Cronemillar v. Duluth-Superior Milling
Co., 134 Wis. 248, 114 N. W. 432, is hardly in point. It holds that
the refusal to permit an employee to begin work under a contract
terminable at will entitles the employee to at least nominal damages.
Several cases are more nearly in line with the decision in the instant
case than any of those cited; the following allowed a recovery, but
limited it to nominal damages, under circumstances remotely resem-
bling those of the instant case: Atkins v. Van Buren School Township,
77 Ind. 447 (for refusing to let plaintiff begin work under a con-
tract whose term was not specified) ; Kelly v. Fahrney, 38 C. C. A.
103, 97 F. 176 (for breach of an executory agreement to loan money,
where no definite time for the continuance of the loan was agreed on,
the law implying an agreement to repay on demand); Noble v. Hand
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et al., 163 Mass 289, 39 N. E. 1020 (for breach of an agreement to
send samples to plaintiff, defendant's salesman, to use in securing
orders for defendants' goods, defendants having reserved the right
to reject any orders the plaintiff might have received).
F. W. F., '27.
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INJURIES-GRATUITOUS NURS-
ING.-Cor nm v. Davis, 130 A. 448 (N. J. 1925).
This was an action for personal injuries, brought by a mar-
ried woman, with her husband joining a claim per quod. The
husband remained away from work two weeks to nurse his wife, and
claimed, as an item of damages, the amount of his wazes during
that period. The trial court allowed a recovery of this item. The
appellate court held that the lower court did not err in instructing the
jury that the husband could recover for his loss of wages while
nursing his wife. The propriety of an instruction must be tested by
the facts of the particular case (citing State v. Egan, 84 N. J. L. 701,
87 A. 455), and the court took judicial notice of the fact that a trained
nurse could not have been hired for less than the amount of the hus-
band's wages, remarking that, if the husband had been earning greatly
in excess of the salary of a nurse for that period, the trial court prob-
ably would not have given the instruction it did.
Without this explanation, the decision would seem to be directly
contrary to the weight of authority, being supported only by Pullman
Palace Car Co. v. Smith. 79 Tex. 468. 14 S. W. 993, 23 A. S. R.
356, 13 L. R. A. 215; while the following cases hold that the dam-
ages recoverable for nursing by a member of the injured person's
family are the reasonable value of such services as a nurse, and not
the amount lost by abstaining from other employment: Hazard Pow-
der Co. v. Folger, 7 C. C. A. 130, 58 F. 152, 12 U. S. App. 665;
Town of Salida v. McKinna, 16 Colo. 523, 27 P. 810; Dormer v. Al-
catra! Paving Co., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 407: Barnes v. Keene, 132 N.
Y. 13, 29 N. E. 1090: Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 12
Tex. Civ. A. 654, 35 S. W. 335, holds that the time lost by a husband
in nursing his wife is an element of damages in an action for her in-
jury, but states no basis of computing the value of the time lost.
If the instant case is regarded as deciding only that a husband
may recover for his services in nursing his wife injured by defendant,
the reasonable value of such services and no more, it is in accord
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